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state and federal governments to tax reciprocally income received
either as governmental salary or as interest on governmental
obligations. The instant case seems to remove any doubt of the
constitutionality of this legislation as applied to salaries. In fact,
however, it is notorious that the federal government anticipates
comparatively little revenue from this source. 1' Since Congress
can withdraw the immunity of federal securities," the main
battle over such legislation will concern federal taxation of income derived from state securities. The Gerhardt case and the
present O'Keefe case are merely preliminary skirmishes; they
indicate a trend in favor of the tax-collector. Recognition of this
trend is expressed by Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissenting from
the majority opinion in the instant case: ".

.

. safely it may be

said that presently marked for destruction is the doctrine of reciprocal immunity that by recent decisions here has been so much
impaired."' 6
F. S. C., Jr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE REGULATION OF BUSINESS-THE-

order to aid independent exhibitors of motion pictures,
North Dakota enacted a statute' designed to prohibit the operation of motion picture theaters "owned, managed or operated in
whole or in part, by any producer or distributor of motion picture
films or in which any such producer or distributor has any
interest, direct or indirect, legal or equitable, through stock ownership or otherwise." 2 The plaintiffs were producers and distributors of films and through a subsidiary corporation they owned
ten theaters in the state. In a suit to enjoin the enforcement of
the act it was held, (1) that the act does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment as its policy bears a reasonable relation to a
proper public purpose; it is not palpably in excess of legislative
power, and the means provided for enforcement of the policy
declared by the act are neither arbitrary nor unreasonable; (2)
that since the act relates only to the operation of motion picture
ATERs-In

14. Government experts estimate that the revenue from federal income
tax on 2,600,000 state and municipal employees will be $16,000,000. The taxes
to be paid by the 1,200,000 government workers will depend on state taxation.
Wood, High Court Permits Taxes on Salaries, State and Federal, N.Y. Times,
March 28, 1939, p. 1, col. 1.
15. Van Allen v. The Assessors, 70 U.S. 578, 18 L.Ed. 229 (1866).
16. 59 S.Ct. 595, 604, 83 L.Ed. 577 (1939).

1. N.D. Laws 1937, c. 165.
2. Id. at § 3.
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theaters within the state and not to the distribution of films in
interstate commerce it only remotely affects such commerce.
ParamountPictures v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. 890 (D.C. N.D. 1938).1
The general proposition that a state, under its police powers,
may regulate all kinds of businesses 4 is settled by a wealth of
cases dealing with almost every type of enterprise, trade, occupation and profession.5 Such regulation is invalid only where it
amounts to an arbitrary or unwarranted interference with the
right of the citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment to pursue lawful business.6 To what lengths this power of regulation
may go is conjectural; each case stands on its on merits.
Generally, statutes designed to foster local industry or to
aid the independent operator in his struggle with chain competition have been upheld as valid tax measures.7 The power of
3. The case was taken to the United States Supreme Court by appeal,
and the temporary injunction was maintained. The Supreme Court by a
per curiam order, on March 27, 1939, granted a motion to reverse, and remanded the cause with directions to dismiss the proceedings on the ground
that the cause had become moot. (1939) C.C.H., p. 4578. The case retains its
importance, however, as other states have been contemplating the passage
of acts similar to this North Dakota statute.
4. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873); Chicago B. &
Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 26 S.Ct. 341, 50 L.Ed. 596 (1906); Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. Police Court, 251 U.S. 22, 40 S.Ct. 79, 64 L.Ed. 112 (1919).
5. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1877) (grain elevators);
Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 20 S.Ct. 633, 44 L.Ed. 725 (1900) (sale of
cigarettes); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 34 S.Ct. 612, 58
L.Ed. 1011 (1914) (insurance companies); Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340, 36
S.Ct. 561, 60 L.Ed. 1034 (1916) (employment agencies); Lehon v. Atlanta,
242 U.S. 53, 37 S.Ct. 70, 61 L.Ed. 145 (1916) (private detectives); Merchants'
Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U.S. 365, 39 S.Ct. 114, 63 L.Ed. 300 (1919) (public
weighers of grain); La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465, 39 S.Ct. 160, 63
L.Ed. 362 (1919) (insurance agents); Bloch v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct.
458, 65 L.Ed. 865, 16 A.L.R. 165 (1921) (housing); Bratton v. Chandler, 260
U.S. 110, 43 S.Ct. 43, 67 L.Ed. 157 (1922) (real estate brokers); Graves v.
Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 47 S.Ct. 122, 71 L.Ed. 331 (1926) (dentists); Hayman
v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414, 47 S.Ct. 363, 71 L.Ed. 714 (1927) (physicians); Hodge
Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335, 52 S.Ct. 144, 76 L.Ed. 323
(1932) (renting of automobiles); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505,
78 L.Ed. 940 (1934) (milk); Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La.
214, 182 So. 485 (1938) (barbers); Dillon v. Erie R. Co., 19 Misc. 116, 43 N. Y.
Supp. 320 (1897) (railroads); Abbye Employment Agency v. Robinson, 166
Misc. 820, 2 N.Y.S. (2d) 947 (1938) (employment).
6. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 48 S.Ct. 545, 72 L.Ed. 913 (1928); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 49 S.Ct. 115, 73 L.Ed. 287 (1929); New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 S.Ct. 371, 76 L.Ed. 747 (1932);
Kent Stores of New Jersey v. Wilentz, 14 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. N.J. 1936); Replogle v. Little Rock, 166 Ark. 617, 267 S.W. 353 (1925); People v. Havnor,
149 N.Y. 195, 43 N.E. 541 (1896).
7. E.g., American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 21 S.Ct.
43, 45 L.Ed. 102 (1900); Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 30 S.Ct.
578, 54 L.Ed. 883 (1910); Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 1, 38 S.Ct. 267, 62
L.Ed. 547 (1918); Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 S.Ct. 540, 75
L.Ed. 1248 (1931); A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 54 S.Ct. 599, 78
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the state to deal with practices and situations which may reasonably be deemed promotive of monopoly and restraint of trade
has also been consistently upheld." The inherent difference between corporations and natural persons has been recognized
as sufficient to sustain a separate classification for the purpose
of imposing restrictions or prohibitions upon the former.9
Discrimination in favor of a certain class does not make
a statute arbitrary if the discrimination is based upon a reasonable distinction.10 In a case analogous to the one under discussion, a Missisippi statute forbidding the ownership of cotton
gins by corporations interested in the manufacture of cottonseed oil was held to be constitutional, when the facts showed that
such ownership tended to give these corporations a monopoly
on ginning." Similarly, the court in the instant case concluded
that the differences between exhibitors affiliated with distributors and producers and those exhibitors operating independ12
ently, justified a separate classification and treatment.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the oft-quoted
Nebbia case13 stated that ".

.

. the guaranty of due process . . .

demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary,
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." Furthermore, in the same case, the Court laid down the broad doctrine
that, upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures, the state
may regulate a busines in any of its aspects; the courts are both
incompetent and unauthorized to deal with the wisdom of the
policy adopted by the state and the measures taken to carry it
L.Ed. 1109 (1934); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 57
S.Ct. 772, 81 L.Ed. 1198 (1937).
8. E.g., Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 25 S.Ct. 289, 49 L.Ed. 546 (1905);
National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 25 S.Ct. 379, 49 L.Ed. 689
(1905); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 29 S.Ct. 220, 53 L.Ed.
417 (1909); Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 29 S.Ct. 370,
53 L.Ed. 530 (1909); Grenada Lbr. Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433, 30 S.Ct.
535, 54 L.Ed. 826 (1910); International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S.
199, 84 S.Ct. 859, 68 L.Ed. 1276 (1914); Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi,
257 U.S. 129, 42 S.Ct. 42, 66 L.Ed. 166 (1921).
9. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 29 S.Ct. 370, 53 L.Ed.
530 (1909); Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 34 S.Ct. 15,
58 L.Ed. 127 (1913)t
10. Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 30 S.Ct. 578, 54 L.Ed.
883 (1910); Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 S.Ct. 540, 75 L.Ed.
1248 (1931).
11. Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129, 42 S.Ct. 42, 66
L.Ed. 166 (1921).
12. Paramount Pictures v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. 890, 902 (D.C. N.D. 1938).
13. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940
(1934).
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out. 14 The function of the courts is to determine in each case
whether circumstances are sufficiently strong to sustain the
challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental
authority.
Applying the criteria of the Nebbia decision, the court in '
the principal case concluded that the policy declared by the
North Dakota statute had a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, finding a wealth of precedent for the enactment
of laws which require a separation of the ownership, management and control of certain classes of business. 1 The court was
unable to find any unfair trade practices but the existence of the
unusual power of the affiliated exhibitor to deal unfairly with
competitors was thought a sufficient basis for guarding against
the possibility of future exercise of such power, especially in
view of evidence showing unfair practices in the past.'
The contention that the statute would be a burden on interstate commerce was briefly dismissed by the statement that the
burden was too remote. 17 The fact that state regulation affects
interstate commerce does not of itself render it invalid.'8 Moreover, the operation of motion picture theaters can be said to be
local and subject to the state's police power.19
The motion picture industry is controlled by eight major
companies (five of which are engaged in all three branches of the
industry-production, distribution and exhibition-two in production and distribution, and the last in distribution alone) yet
20
it has been stated that there is no monopoly in the distribution.
However, the independent competitor is left little room for free14. 291 U.S. at 537.
15. Paramount Pictures v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. 890, 901-902 (D.C. N.D.
1938).
16. 23 F. Supp. at 900.
17. Paramount Pictures v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. 890, 895 (D.C. N.D. 1938).
Support for this holding is found in the unwillingness of the Supreme Court
to invalidate state anti-trust legislation. Cf. Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129, 42 S.Ct. 42, 66 L.Ed. 166 (1921); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.
v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 57 S.Ct. 772, 81 L.Ed. 1193 (1937).
18. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 262, 30 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.
472 (1910); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Washington, 300 U.S. 154, 57 S.Ct.
504, 81 L.Ed. 573 (1936); State v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 94 Kan. 96,
145 Pac. 831 (1915); Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 81 W.Va.
457, 94 S.E. 545 (1917).
19. Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Comm., 236 U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387, 59
L.Ed. 552 (1915); United States v. Interstate Circuit, 20 F. Supp. 868 (N.D.
Tex. 1937).
20. See Whitman, Anti-Trust Cases Affecting the Distribution of Motion
Pictures (1938) 7 Fordham L. Rev. 189. Cf. note 24, infra.
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dom of activity by the present practice 21 of the motion picture
industry. These will continue unless halted by state or federal
legislation. The present federal anti-trust laws have been ineffectual to date due to the difficulty of obtaining sufficient proof
of a conspiracy in restraint of trade.2 2 State legislation as to the
distribution of films must run the gauntlet of invalidity on the
ground of unduly burdening interstate commerce, for distribution
clearly involves interstate commerce. 23 Although the North Dakota statute herein involves an intrastate activity, it does bear
some relation to interstate commerce. Whether it unduly burdens
interstate commerce will be decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the near future. 2' The Supreme Court may
possibly find-and properly so-that exhibition, although among
the activities which are themselves intrastate commerce, has a
direct and important relation to interstate commerce and is susceptible of both state and federal regulation.
F.S.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP-THIRD PARTY PRACTICE-The plaintiff, a resident of Penn-

sylvania, brought an action in a Pennsylvania court against
McGwinn, a nonresident, to recover for personal injuries sustained
in an automobile collision. On the petition of this defendant,
the case was removed into the federal court which thereupon
21. Unless affiliated with one of these companies or an independent
circuit, the independent exhibitor is (1) faced with inferior bargaining
power, (2) harassed by "block" booking contracts which force him to take
poor pictures along with good ones, (3) subjected to clearance schedules
which prevent him from obtaining the best pictures for a specified time
after the first run, and (4) discriminated against in obtaining contracts.
See Comment (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 424; Note (1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 635.
22. The courts have laid great emphasis on the determination of whether
or not the distributors have acted in concert or as a result of an understanding among themselves in the adoption of a particular type of contract provisions. Very little consideration has as yet been given to what
provisions in the contract are reasonable and why they indirectly affect
but do not burden interstate commerce. Cf. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 51 S.Ct. 42, 75 L.Ed. 145 (1930); United States
v. First National Pictures, 282 U.S. 44, 51 S.Ct. 45, 75 L.Ed. 151 (1930); Federal Trade Comm. v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F. (2d) 152 (C.C.A.
2nd, 1932).
23. Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291, 44 S.Ct. 96, 68 L.Ed.
808 (1923); Majestic Theatre Co. v. United Artists Corp., 43 F. (2d) 991
(D.C. Conn. 1930).
24. There is now pending in the federal courts an action filed by the
United States Department of Justice against the eight major producers
and distributors for violation of the Sherman Act, seeking to compel them
to relinquish their ownership or interests in theaters. United States v.
Paramount Pictures (Equity 87-273, S.D. N.Y. 1938).

